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The scale-fee networks, having connectivity distribution P (k) ∼ k−α (where k is the
site connectivity), is very resilient to random failures but fragile to intentional attack.
The purpose of this paper is to find the network design guideline which can make the
robustness of the network to both random failures and intentional attack maximum
while keeping the average connectivity < k > per node constant. We find that when
< k >= 3 the robustness of the scale-free networks reach its maximum value if the
minimal connectivity m = 1 , but when < k > is larger than four, the networks will
become more robust to random failures and targeted attacks as the minimal connectivity
m gets larger.
Keywords: Scale-free network; optimal programme; power-law distribution; random fail-
ure.
1. Introduction
Recently, there has much interest in the resilience of scale-free network to random
attacks or to intentional attacks on the highest degree nodes.1−4 Many real-world
networks are scale-free and robust to random attacks but vulnerable to intentional
attacks. It is important for us to know the optimal scale free network guideline to
design networks which are optimally robust against both types of attacks. Although
many papers have designed the optimal network topology, such as the two-peak
and three-peak optimal complex network 13, but we can not convert its topology
1
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to the theoretical optimization directly disobeying its evolutionary principle. On
the contrary, we should study the optimal scale-free network guideline to improve
the existed scale-free network robustness.
Studies to data 12,13 have been considered only the case in which there was
only one type of attack in a given network, that is, the network was subject to
either a random attack or a targeted attack but not subject to different types of
attack simultaneously. A more realistic model is the one in which a network is
subjected to simultaneous targeted and random attacks. We focus on the network
state after intentional and random attacks which remove fractions ptarget and prand
of the original nodes, respectively.
In the scale-free networks, the degree distribution P (k) is the probability of a
node have k connections to other nodes, typically decreases as a power of k. Thus
with a fraction p of the nodes and their connections of the scale-free network are
removed randomly, the random chosen node would have a low degree, so its removal
has little effect on the network. Removal of a highly connected node could produce
a large effect. However, since such a node may hold significant fractions of the
network together by providing connections between many other nodes. Cohen et. al
9 presented a criterion to calculate the percolation critical threshold of randomly
connected networks. If we attack the scale-free network intentionally: the removal of
sites is not random, but rather sites with the highest connectivity are targeted first.
The numerical simulations suggest that scale-free network are highly sensitive to
this kind of attack 11. Cohen et. al 10 studied the exact value of the critical fraction
needed for disruption and the size. Thus networks with a given degree distribution
may be very resilient to one type of attack but not to another. This raises two
questions we addressed in this paper: How can we optimize scale-free network to
both random failure and targeted attack and how to improve the scale free network
robustness when the network size becomes larger. If we construct and maintain a
network with given number of nodes as being proportional to the average number
of links < k > per node in the network. Then, our goal becomes how to maximize
the robustness of a network with N nodes to both random failure and intentional
attack. In our analysis, we compare the robustness of networks which have the same
“links” of construction, where we define the cost to be proportional to the average
degree < k > of all the nodes in the network.
This paper is organized as follows. In the first phase, we give the optimization
method to construct the network which is more robust to random failures. In the
second phase, we analysis the intentional attack to the scale-free network. In the
third phase, we give the optimal strategy of the network design to both random
failure and intentional attack.
2. Optimal Strategy for Random Failures
Cohen have studied the properties of the percolation phase transition in scale-free
random networks, and applied a general criterion for the existence of a spanning
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cluster:
κ ≡
< k2 >
< k >
= 2. (1)
When a fraction p of the nodes are randomly removed, or a fraction p of the links
are randomly removed, the distribution of site connectivity is changed from the
original P (k) to a new distribution P˜ (k)
P˜ (k) =
K∑
k0≥k
P (k0)
(
k0
k
)
(1 − p)kpk0−k. (2)
Thus, the critical threshold pc can be expressed as:
<k20>
<k0>
(1−pc)+pc = 2, that is pc =
1 − 1
κ0−1
, where κ0 ≡< k
2
0 > / < k0 > is calculated from the original connectivity
distribution. A wide range of networks have power-law degree distribution: P (k) =
ck−α, k = m,m+ 1, . . . ,K, where k = m is the minimal connectivity and k = K
is an effective connectivity cutoff presented in finite networks. The parameter c of
the power-law distribution can be approximate estimated by c ≈ mα−1(α− 1). The
average connectivity < k > per node is
< k >=
(α − 1)
(α − 2)
m[1−N−
α−2
α−1 ].
The numerical results show that the exponent α and the minimum connectivity m
have following two relationships: (i)To a constant average connectivity < k >, the
exponent α increases when the minimum connectivity m increases; (ii) To the min-
imum connectivity m = 1, the exponent α decreases when the average connectivity
< k > of the network increases.
The κ0 of the scale-free network can be approximated by
κ0 =
2− α
3− α
[K(2−α) −m(2−α)]
[K(3−α) −m(3−α)]
. (3)
Our goal is to maximize the threshold for random removal with the condition that
the average degree < k > per node is constant. We construct the following model.

max {1− 1
κ0−1
}
s.t. (α−1)(α−2)m[1−N
−
α−2
α−1 ] =< k >,
m ∈ Z+,
(4)
where κ0 =
2−α
3−α
[K(2−α)−m(2−α)]
[K(3−α)−m(3−α)]
. The numerical results suggest that whether the
network size N is very large or not, pc reaches its maximum value when m = 1. We
can get the following three conclusions:
(i) If the average connectivity < k > per node and the exponent α of the scale-
free network is constant, the robustness of the network will decrease when the
network size becomes larger.
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(ii) If the network size N is constant, the robustness of the network increases when
the average connectivity < k > becomes larger.
(iii) To the random failures, we have to take several times cost to increase the
robustness of the scale-free network one percent.
3. Breakdown under Intentional Attack
Consider the intentional attack, or sabotage, to the scale-free network, whereby a
fraction p of the sites with the highest connectivity is removed, and the links ema-
nating from the sites are removed as well. This would make the cutoff connectivity
K of the network reduce to some new value, K˜ < K. Because the upper cutoff K
before intentional attack can be estimated from
∑∞
k=K P (k) =
1
N
, the new cutoff
K˜, after the attack, can be estimated by
K∑
k=K˜
P (k) =
∞∑
k=K˜
P (k)−
1
N
= p. (5)
Because c ≈ mα−1(α− 1), then we have
p ≈ (
K˜
m
)(α−1) −
1
N
. (6)
If the network size N is very large, N−1 ∼ o(10−2), the threshold p for intentional
attack may be estimated by (K˜/m)(1−α) = p.
The intentional attack process to the scale-free network can be described as
following two steps:
(i) Removal of the highest connectivity nodes;
(ii) Removal of the links leading to removed nodes.
So intentional attack to the scale-free network can be considered as a random
removal of links which connect the removed sites with the remaining sites. We define
the probability of removing a link in the sabotage is p˜ and all links in the network
have the same probability of being deleted. We have known that the threshold for
random removal of nodes for scale-free network is
1− prandc =
1
κ0 − 1
. (7)
Then the next task is to find the probability p˜. The removal of a fraction p of the
sites with the highest connectivity results in a random removal of links from the
remaining sites that had connected the removed sites with the remaining sites. The
probability p˜ of a link leading to deleted site equals the ratio of the number of links
belonging to deleted sites to the total number of links
p˜ =
K∑
k=K˜
kP (k)
< κ0 >
, (8)
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Table 1. The value of ptarget when N = 106 to different < k >.
m = 1 m = 2 m = 3 m = 4 m = 5 m = 6
k = 3 0.0562 0.2010 – – – –
k = 4 0.0627 0.2152 0.4627 – – –
k = 5 0.0617 0.2100 0.4301 0.6240 – –
k = 6 0.0582 0.2003 0.4022 0.5879 0.7172 –
k = 7 0.0523 0.1895 0.3780 0.5567 0.6879 0.7754
where κ0 is the initial average connectivity per node. With the continuous approx-
imation, this yields
p˜ =
∫
K
k=K˜
ck1−αdk
<κ0>
,
= 2−α
c
(K2−α −m2−α)−1 c2−α (K
2−α − K˜(2−α))
= (K2−α − K˜(2−α))(K2−α −m2−α)−1
= (K˜/m)2−α[1− (K
K˜
)2−α][1− (K
m
)2−α]−1.
(9)
In the scale-free network K >> m, this yields
p˜ = (K˜/m)2−α[1− (
K
K˜
)2−α]. (10)
Replacing pc and K in (7) with (10) and K˜, this yields the equation:{
1− (
K˜
m
)(2−α)[1− (
K
K˜
)(2−α)]
}{2− α
3− α
K˜(3−α) −m(3−α)
K˜(2−α) −m(2−α)
− 1
}
= 1, (11)
which can be solved numerically to obtain K˜(m,α,K), and then pc(m,α) can be
retrieved from (6). When N = 106, the numerical results are as follows.
From table 1, we can see that: (1) the scale-free network is very fragile when
the minimum connectivity m equals to 1. If intentionally remove about five percent
nodes which have the highest connectivity of the scale-free network, the network
would collapse. (2) The robustness of the network would increases dramatically
when the minimum connectivity m increases.
The maximum value of ptargetc is obtained in the situation in which all the nodes
have the same degree, in which case the targeted attack becomes equivalent to
random failure. Thus we can use the equation (7) to find ptargetc . The upper bound
is therefore given by
ptargetc ≤ 1−
1
< k > −1
.
4. Optimization of Robustness of Complex Network
When the scale free network was attacks randomly and targeted simultaneously, a
metric we can use to measure the robustness of the network to both random failure
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and targeted attack is the sum
ptotalc = p
rand
c + p
target
c . (12)
This is only one of a number of possible metrics we can use. The results are, in
general, not dependent on the metric chosen.
Our purpose can be stated as follows: for a network of a given number of nodes
N , how to maximize ptotalc while keep the number of links constant.
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Fig. 1. Random, targeted and total critical percolation thresholds for scale-free networks to dif-
ferent < k >
In figure 1, we plot the values of ptargetc , p
rand
c and p
total
c for the minimum con-
nectivity m. Because the exponent α would increase as the minimum connectivity
increase, we can plot the figure for a range of exponent α too. In the figure, we set
the number of nodes N = 106 and k = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. For these choices of < k >, we
find that:
(1) If m = 1, or α is around 2.5, ptotalc is optimized if the average connectivity
< k >= 3. The telephone call graph14,15 belongs among this type of network.
(2) If < k > is larger than four, the network would become more robust as the
minimum connectivity (or the exponent α) increases. Many networks belong
among this type of network, such as coauthorship network. 16−21 This conclu-
sion shows that the relation between the minimum connectivity nodes of the
network is very important. More tight the relationship between the minimum
degree nodes of the scale-free networks, more robust the network would be.
5. Discussion and Summary
Although the theoretical optimal networks to both random and targeted attacks
have been designed, it is very important that some large size networks, such as the
internet, is a self-organizing system, evolve and drastically changes over time ac-
cording to evolutionary principle dictated by the interplay between cooperation and
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competition. To the exist growing scale-free network, we can not convert its topol-
ogy into the theoretical optimization directly disobeying its evolutionary principle.
But we can improve the network robustness. Firstly, we must know the optimal
guideline to maximum the scale-free network robustness.
The ptotalc characterizes the robustness of the scale-free network to random fail-
ures and intentional attacks simultaneously. In this paper we analyze the scale-free
network robustness to both random failures and intentional attacks simultaneously
and find that the minimum degree of the network is very important to the scale-free
network robustness with a constant < k >. To an exist growing scale-free network,
if the network average degree per node is around three, we should keep its minimum
degree around one to improve the network robustness. But if the network average
connectivity is larger than four, we should add its minimum degree to improve its
robustness to both attacks, which mean that the relationship between the minimum
connectivity nodes would become very important for the network robustness.
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